The Bear and the Eagle at the end of the world
Ideology and the Cold War; on historians Schlesinger, Theoharis, and White.
On March 5th 1946, former Prime Minister Winston Churchill arrived in a small town in Missouri and delivered a speech that would ever after be considered by many to be the start of the Cold War. Standing alongside US President Harry Truman, Churchill declared that USSR General Secretary Joseph Stalin’s ‘Iron Curtain’ — a term coined by Churchill in this speech to describe the buffer zone of Communist states between Eastern and Western Europe — was a threat to peace and stability in a world still smoking from the dying embers of the Second World War. After the end of the War, Truman, Churchill and Stalin met in Berlin to discuss how to deal with Germany and post-war Europe, where it was agreed that Stalin would take Eastern Europe, but was made to promise to let individuals states hold free and fair elections. Shockingly, they all became unanimously Communist almost immediately, and this strip of communist puppet-governments was what Churchill then referred to as the ‘Iron Curtain’. Churchill’s speech wasn’t in itself the first time this was spoken about, but it was the first time that anyone had acknowledged the façade of Russo-European co-operation, and crumbled it. The lead-up to this moment was a long time coming, and some historians argue that if it weren’t for the mutual threat from German Naziism, it may have happened a lot earlier. The Soviet Union and the United States of America had fundamentally opposing ideologies, and so were always destined to clash. This disagreement in ideology was certainly a large factor in the rising tensions between the USA and USSR in the middle of the 20th Century, despite other factors adding fuel to the fire. The USA firmly believed in a free market economy and capitalism, where individuals and corporations owned land and property; the Soviets held the Marxist-Leninist belief that all property should be State-owned and people should live under a state-controlled economy. The USA feared the spread of Communist ideology and the standards of living in Soviet Russia did itself no favours. Most obviously was the way East Berlin was treated under Soviet control: John F. Kennedy once famously said that “freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in.”
Code-named ‘Trinity’, the first successful atomic bomb was dropped from a 100-foot tower over the middle of the New Mexican desert at precisely 0530 hours on July 16 1945, eight months before Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech. Watching the detonation of the first plutonium bomb, as 18.6 kilotons of power were released and the tower was instantly vaporised, Dr Robert Oppenheimer, lead theoretical physicist of the Manhattan Project, uttered the infamous line of Hindu scripture: “Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.” The subsequent dropping of the two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were poignant moments for two whole separate wars. “We knew the world would never be the same,” recounted Oppenheimer on that first test. “A few people laughed, a few people cried, but most were silent.” Some historians argue this attack — the final action of the Second World War — was the first in the Cold War. Not only did it put a final end to the dragging on of the World War, but it served as a show of US power intended, some argue, to intimidate Stalin. As Chronicle of the World, a historical magazine launched in 1989, said, “after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nothing was ever the same again […] the use of the atomic bomb in August 1945 changed the world more dramatically than any single event before,” and it was undoubtably correct: this was the beginning the Soviet-US Arms Race, and within four years, Russia had its own nuclear arsenal after its first successful test on a site in Kazakhstan.
Ideologically diametrically opposed, many argue the USA and USSR’s political clash was inevitable as both moved to fill the power vacuum left by Germany’s defeat in Western Europe.
The extent to which ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the USA caused the Cold War has been heavily debated for more than seventy years. Many argue that this ideological clash was inevitable in a world still smoking from the embers of the Second World War, as both superpowers hoped to fill the power vacuum left in Europe by the defeat of Germany. Traditionalist historian Arthur Schlesinger argues in favour of this viewpoint, blaming Soviet aggression for the tensions caused in the 1945-53 period. He wrote ‘Origins of the Cold War’ in 1967 for the Council on Foreign Affairs, arguing that the Cold War was caused primarily by Stalin’s paranoia that America was intent on control. Russia’s adherence to its Marxist-Leninist ideology, and such events as Truman’s dropping of atomic bombs on Japan, exacerbated this already-shaky political landscape. Schlesinger’s orthodox views differ from the likes of Athan Theoharis, who makes the revisionist argument that there was blame on both sides; in ‘Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War’, Theoharis focuses on specific people and their personalities that led to the geopolitical tensions. From an entirely different perspective, writing in 2000, Timothy J. White draws a middle-ground with a post-1991 Revisionist perspective, reasonably arguing that there was blame on both sides. In ‘Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies’, White cites multiple causes of the Cold War, and would be widely regarded as the most neutral of the three historians: he wrote after the USSR’s formal dissolution, after which the Soviet archives were declassified and released.
In ‘Origins of the Cold War,’[1] Schlesinger expresses his belief that the Cold War was the sole fault of Russia caused by deeply rooted ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the USA. Schlesinger was fundamentally orthodox in his views, in his own words, “the orthodox American view[…] has been that the Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression.”[2] Schlesinger’s accusation of “aggression” is loaded; this judgement was likely influenced by the 1950s Red Scare and McCarthyist eras. Schlesinger wrote in the 1960s, a highly tense point in the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis was reaching its boiling point, combined with the U-2 spy plane and B-59 Submarine incidents[3]. Schlesinger viewed Communist ideology as violent, aggressive, and authoritarian, and had obvious cause to hold his rigidly orthodox views. He acted as primary speechwriter for Democratic presidential candidate Stevenson and served as assistant to Kennedy; he was notably very involved with politics at the time of his writing and would have been a strongly influential writer. This casts a potential shadow over the reasons for his writing: it was in his interests to make the Soviets seem as aggressive and difficult as possible.
The threat of Soviet “aggression” was real and a valid concept: the West had observed the violence and brutal determination of Russia, such as the 1940 Katyn massacre[4] in Poland, where Soviet troops executed members of the Polish military and prisoners of war. Over 22,000 bodies[5] were exhumed from the graves. Russia and Poland were supposed to be allies, but this horrific display of violence showed Soviet forward planning, trying to weaken Poland for what the world could only assume was a planned takeover. It also showed the USSR to be conniving and underhand, stabbing Poland in the back to further their own future aggressive plans.
Schlesinger says, “nothing the United States could have done in 1944-45 would have abolished this mistrust, […] sanctified as it was by Marxist gospel — nothing short of the conversion of the US to a Stalinist despotism,”[6] would have ceased tensions. This categorisation of the Marxist ideology as ‘gospel’ is accurate — as Russia became increasingly secular, alongside the overhaul of the Tsarist regime, the religious void was filled with political rhetoric which mirrored gospel: Marx’s Manifesto did become a pseudo-bible, used by Lenin and Stalin to create the new State. Schlesinger is right in saying that the USA and USSR could never co-exist. Coupled with their strict ideological absolutism was the idea of communist expansionism. As originally set out by Marx, “workers of all countries unite,”saying that ‘true communism’ would only be achievable if communism spread. The concept of ‘Socialism in One Country’ is fundamentally juxtaposing: whereas Marxism required the conversion of all countries, Lenin (and then Stalin) had for decades an internal focus maintaining the internal communist state in Russia. Weighing up this evidence, it becomes clear that much of the Soviet expansion was down to circumstances rather than specific planning. As Russia pushed German Nazis out of satellite states, the Soviets decided to retain this control.
These satellite states became a key areas of focus for Russia: they kept the ‘Iron Curtain’ buffer zone between themselves and Western Europe. While America was focused on the Western World and their universalism, Schlesinger says that “the Kremlin […] thought only of spheres of influence,”[7] phrasing this as an unacceptable alternative to American Universalism. Russia knew world domination would not be possible, especially with America as a politically charged and powerful enemy. Schlesinger quotes Kennan, saying “behind Russia’s stubborn expansion lies only the age-old sense of insecurity.”[8] Using this quote implies that Russia held deep insecurities, due in part to their geographical vulnerability (lack of the natural defences) between Russia and Western Europe, which is why they focused on their sphere of influence so heavily. In 1946, Churchill delivered a speech in Missouri, coining the phrase ‘Iron Curtain.’ At this point, the buffer-zone of Communist puppet states was established, a clear Soviet sphere of influence. As Schlesinger’s observation that Russia obsessed over spheres of influence shows, the Soviet desire was to maintain Communism where they could, before advancing into Marxist expansionism.
One American reaction to Soviet expansionism was universalism. Schlesinger’s view is that American universalism was “rooted in the American legal and moral tradition.” Although there is truth to this, it went further: they wanted universal uniformity, with the USA acting as a beacon of capitalist society that all other countries would become carbon-copies of. Schlesinger was a speechwriter: he often obfuscates to make his true sentiment difficult to place; he believes it is America’s duty to create an international “America,”: a world capitalism. American universalism was seen by Russia to be a direct threat, especially when they were focusing more on ‘Socialism in One Country,’ while America was already broaching the idea of a universal-America. As Schlesinger says, “each side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but regard as a threat to the principles of the peace,” and “it was these factors which charged the debate between universalism and spheres of influence with apocalyptic potentiality.[9]”
Another factor leading towards the escalation of geopolitical tensions was the political personalities of the leaders. Theoharis, in ‘Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War’[10] leans towards practical revisionism. Theoharis “emphasize[s] the tactics and personalities of Roosevelt and Truman, [and] their specific responses to Soviet policy,” outlining his revisionist argument that America should take more blame for the Cold War, which he says “coincide[s] with intense research.” However, he goes on to quote Gardener, an historian from the University of Wisconsin, saying “the US was more responsible for the way in which the Cold War developed”[11]. Theoharis does not claim that America was the entire cause, but he is especially critical of Truman’s anti-Communist rhetoric. Theoharis focuses on Yalta[12], arguing that Roosevelt viewed the agreements as an attempt to secure a peaceful post-war world, whereas Truman saw it purely as Soviet appeasement. Roosevelt believed that the agreements, (including the division of Germany into occupation zones — ultimately leading to the Checkpoint Charlie clash), would lead to a cooperative relationship between the US and the USSR. Truman, on the other hand, believed that the USSR could not be trusted and that the agreements made at Yalta would ultimately lead to Soviet expansion. After Roosevelt’s death, Truman’s policies became dominant in America. In Theoharis’ view, Truman attempted to agree with public opinion about the shortcomings of Roosevelt while simultaneously skirting taking responsibility for these issues; after Roosevelt's death in April 1945, Truman had to be strong; he also had to distance himself from Roosevelt.
The Truman Doctrine, shrouded in ideological rhetoric, was his response, drawing a line in the sand. The Doctrine “established that the US would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat.”[13] This was seen by the USSR as a direct provocation. As Schlesinger said, both countries exacerbated the tensions due to their seeming inability to do anything but criticise each other, making policies both sides could only view as hostile. There are also moments where Theoharis criticises Truman’s diplomatic method, as “a craft attempt to have it both ways: to disown earlier concessions,”[14] such as Roosevelt’s Yalta agreements, “without accepting the responsibility of […] establishing new relations.” [15] The Doctrine made Soviet leaders sceptical of Russo-American negotiations. This changed the entire dynamic of the War. Alongside this, Truman needed a means of deterrence, keeping the USSR as far away as possible: the development of the atom bomb acted as perfect defence for the USA.
The degrading nature of Russo-American relations became evermore obvious as the Cold War progressed: during the Second World War, the USA provided[16] huge amounts of financial support to allied countries, one of the largest of whom was the USSR; in 1945 “lend-lease to the Soviets was abruptly terminated.” Theoharis poses this as another potential cause of the Cold War. The Lend-Lease Act provided Russia with food, oil and military supplies: a total of $50.1 billion[17] was invested in the Lend-Lease programme, with over $11 billion of that going to Russia. Theoharis is extremely critical of the way “the State Department also recommended reconsidering the U.S. Commitment to implement the Yalta Far Eastern agreements[18],” on the same day as the removal.[19] It is clear that the programme was halted due to the heightened ideological differences between the two nations; Theoharis explicitly judges that “the Truman Administration’s attempts to ‘undo’ the Yalta commitments led to the Cold War,”[20] and this recommendation from the State Department is shining evidence to support his claim: one of the first concrete signs that the relationship was breaking down.
In 1945, the US launched the Marshall Plan. The USSR refused this help, branding Marshall aid as ‘dollar imperialism,’ claiming America was throwing its economic weight around, attempting to gain influence in European politics. Russia also forbade any of its satellite states in the Eastern Bloc from applying for aid. Theoharis argues that the end of Lend-Lease was solid evidence that the US and USSR relationship was broken, and the Soviet refusal of Marshall aid solidified this further. Theoharis argues the personalities of American leaders also clashed. The personality of Truman, mixed with the ambiguity and general lack of clarity regarding the Potsdam agreements, led to a sense of confusion between the two Superpowers. Theoharis argues “Truman's woeful ignorance of both international politics and the Yalta commitments”[21] led to the ceasing of lend-lease and subsequently the Soviet Union’s refusal to accept any Marshall aid. The Soviets could not compete or cooperate with America’s firm stance, which drove forward the Cold War.
Theoharis’ view is likely a result of him writing a few years after Schlesinger. Schlesinger was born and raised during the Red Scare era, giving heed to his strongly anti-Communist leanings, whereas Theoharis was born in the ‘30s, where two large threats were German Naziism and Italian fascism: right-wing extremism was the immediate threats within Western Europe. He was well into adulthood before Soviet Communism posed a particular threat. Additionally, he wrote his PhD dissertation on the Yalta Conference[22], and is therefore bound to focus on the political dialogue. Theoharis held two bachelor’s and a master’s degree in political science, with a PhD in history. He wrote more than ten books and fifteen articles on the Cold War, tending to focus on the nuances of internal political policy rather than macro events on a larger scale, showing his acute attention to detail with political rhetoric.
Aside from ideological differences between the USA and USSR, another factor was the development of nuclear bombs. The dropping of the two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were key moments. Some historians, including Theoharis, argue this attack was the first in the Cold War as it served as a show of US power. White, in the article ‘Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies,’[23] says “the newly discovered weapon not only offered hope for a quick defeat of Japan, but many believed it held great potential as a tool of intimidation.”[24] This surmises how America had the upper hand in 1945 due to the Manhattan Project, and how the dynamic of the Cold War changed completely when Russia had its own nuclear arsenal after its first successful test on a site in Kazakhstan four years later. Russia had been critically vulnerable from 1945 to ‘49, and when the Soviets developed their own atom bomb, the Cold War escalated quickly: for the first time, the balance was even. The concept of MAD now acted as a mutual deterrent, ensuring neither side would declare war as long as both leaders held any sense of self-preservation. As Chronicle of the World, a Paris-based historical magazine launched in 1989, said, “the use of the atomic bomb in August 1945 changed the world more dramatically than any single event before.” It was undoubtably correct: this was the beginning the Soviet-US Arms Race, and after this point the Cold War escalated rapidly as the relationship broke down further still. Russia was now a more confident state, less insecure now that they had the ultimate means of defence: MAD ensured that America would not strike them. Similarly to Theoharis’ judgement, White expresses the view that “only the nuclear balance of terror prevented this uneasy peace from becoming all-out war,” referencing the impact of MAD. By the end 1945, the USA had only two nuclear bombs, both of which were used on Japan — however, just five years later, the Soviet Union had 5, and by the formal dissolution of the USSR, they overtook the USA with their arsenal, with 37,000 to just 10,000 ICBMs.
White adds the long-term view that “while some cite the failure of Britain and the United States to open a second front against the Nazis before the summer of 1944 as a cause of Soviet mistrust of American intentions[25]&[26], many more interpret the American use of the atomic bomb as an even more blatant attempt to bully the Soviet Union.” By comparison, Schlesinger is clear in his view that “the revisionist argument that Truman dropped the bomb less to defeat Japan than to intimidate Russia is not convincing.”[27] The USA held a grudge since the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbour, and their soldiers fought with brutal determination: they would commit ritualistic suicide rather than admit defeat and surrender[28], and the Kamikaze warriors[29] were infamous throughout the War. America had plenty of reasons to drop the two atomic bombs on Japan, so Schlesinger’s view has merit; however, to say that intimidating Stalin was not a reason would not be consistent with other American policies at the time. Moreover, Theoharis provides further evidence to support Schlesinger’s view, saying that “the successful testing of the atomic bomb led Marshall to concede […] that Soviet entry into the war against Japan was no longer necessary.” It would appear that America used the atomic bomb not purely to intimidate Stalin, nor did they deliberately abandon them in 1944, but that they felt it was not necessary to include more nations in a war that was already over. Additionally, Marshall was concerned that “the Soviet Union could enter anyway and obtain virtually what they want in the surrender terms.” This concern, expressed vicariously through Marshall, was that the USSR would swoop in at the last minute, claim a victory, then make unreasonable surrender demands. White also raises an interesting point about the nonexistence of a second front against the Nazis in ’44. From Stalin’s perspective, it is easy to see how it could be reasoned the West left Russia to fend off the weakening Nazi forces — this would subsequently give cause for Stalin’s general mistrust of any leader further West than Czechoslovakia. Taking all three historians into equal account, White provides the clearest view on the development of the Cold War, from an ideological, personal and factorial perspective.
White would be classified within the Post-1991 Revisionist school of thought, focusing on the factors leading to the inception and continuation of the Cold War, as opposed to passing blame between the two sides. Given the most amount of information available, White holds the opinion that there is equal responsibility on both the USA and USSR. He concludes by stating that “Russians [need] an honest examination of their past [in order to] move beyond the confines of a closed and authoritarian political system,” and that America will be filled with “regret as they honour the achievements of containment but learn of the mistakes made due to an excessive ideological zeal that could never be fully satisfied.” This encapsulates the Cold War completely: “an excessive ideological zeal,” maintained by both the USA and the USSR. In the USA, that came in the form or universalism, the Truman Doctrine and McCarthyism; in the USSR, as expansionism, the Stalinist despotism and Marxism. That this “could never be fully satisfied,” on either sides is blatant: McCarthyism received significant pushback in America, and the Red Terror within Russia caused most Soviet citizens to strongly oppose the regime, albeit usually silently.
White wrote at the turn of the 21st Century, almost 30 years after Schlesinger and Theoharis, and after the Soviet archives were unsealed and released[30] in 1991. This undoubtably allows him the widest field of view within the context of the Cold War, but this provenance doesn’t necessarily negate the issues of other biases. White does, however, go into scrutinising depth around a number of events during the Cold War. As a Post-1991 Revisionist, his opinions would generally be taken with the most objective weight as he had a far clearer overview at the time of his writing, and it makes sense that his focus would be on particular events.
Opinions about the Cold War vary dramatically, and Schlesinger, Theoharis, and White all have differing ideas about its main causes. Schlesinger argues that ideology was the main cause, exacerbated by the Red Scare and McCarthyism in the USA. There is significant evidence to support his claim of communist aggression, the Katyn Massacre being an especially barbaric example. The Marxist ‘gospel’ in Russia had a dichotomising effect on the Soviet and American states, and Soviet Expansionism and American Universalism caused a great deal of geopolitical friction. Theoharis extends this ideological difference, focusing on the personalities of Roosevelt and Truman in and around the Yalta Conference. The Lend-Lease programme, and its withdrawal, showed the first clear example of the crumbling Russo-American relationship, and the Marshall Plan being branded as ‘dollar imperialism’ only magnified this further. White adds to the debate the issues and solutions caused by the development of the atomic bomb — it led to Mutually Assured Destruction, which signified some relief to the rest of the world as well as the USA and USSR, but it did lead to issues microcosmic of the whole Cold War, such as the Checkpoint Charlie situation: nuclear proliferation caused their devolving relationship to be seen on a wider scale. All three historians offer expert outlooks towards, and from within, the Cold War. White makes the strongest argument, that ideological conflict “explain[s] the origin of the Cold War,”[31] while focusing heavily on other factors which added fuel to the fire. It becomes clear that ideology was the underlying cause the Cold War. Other factors were definitely necessary for it to develop in the way that it did, but without, the situation would not nearly have been so volatile; without ideological differences, there would have been no Cold War.
References and Citations
[1] Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1967), Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, Oct., 1967, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Oct. 1967), pp. 22-52, Council on Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations (pub.)
[2] Ibid.
[3] Andrews, Evan (2013), 5 Cold War Close Calls, History.com, October 16, 2013, updated December 13, 2022 [online]. Last accessed 12 February 2023: https://www.history.com/news/5-cold-war-close-calls
[4] Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia, Katyn Massacre, Encyclopedia Britannica, 23 Feb. 2023 [online]. Last accessed March 11 2023: https://www.britannica.com/event/Katyn-Massacre.
[5] Brown, Archie (2009), The Rise and Fall of Communism, HarperCollins (pub.) p. 140
[6] Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1967), Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, Oct., 1967, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Oct. 1967), pp. 22-52, Council on Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations (pub.)
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1967), Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, Oct., 1967, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Oct. 1967), pp. 22-52, Council on Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations (pub.), p. 9
[10] Theoharis, Athan (1972), Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War, Political Science Quarterly, Jun., 1972, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Jun. 1972), pp. 210-241, The Academy of Political Science (pub.)
[11] Gardener, Lloyd C. (1970), Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949, Chicago 1970.
[12] Theoharis, Athan and Esthus, Raymond A. (1970), The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955, The American Historical Review, 5 Dec. 1971, Vol. 76, No. 5, pp. 1623, Columbia: University of Missouri Press (pub.)
[13] Office of the Historian, The Truman Doctrine 1947 [online]. Last accessed March 3 2023: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine#:~:text=With%the%Truman%Doctrine,%President,external%or%internal%authoritarian%forces.
[14] Theoharis, Athan (1972), Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War, Political Science Quarterly, Jun., 1972, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Jun. 1972), pp. 210-241, The Academy of Political Science (pub.), p. 229
[15] Ibid.
[16] Herring, George C (1969), Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1945, The Journal of American History 56, No. 1 (1969): pp. 93–114
[17] McNeill, William H. (1954), America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-Operation and Conflict, 1941–1946, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. xviii, 819. $15.00.), The American Historical Review, Vol. 59, No. 4, Jul. 1954, p. 778
[18] Tsou, Tang (1963), America’s Failure in China: 1941-1950, Chicago, 1963
[19] Theoharis, Athan (1972), Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War, Political Science Quarterly, Jun., 1972, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Jun. 1972), pp. 210-241, The Academy of Political Science (pub.), pp. 213-214
[20] Ibid., p. 212
[21] Ibid., p. 225
[22] Theoharis, Athan (1970), The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955
[23] White, Timothy J. (2000), Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies, International Social Science Review, 2000, Vol. 75, No.s 3 & 4 (2000), Pi Gamma Mu, International Honor Society in Social Sciences (pub.)
[24] Ibid., p. 39
[25] Ulam, Adam (1974), Expansions and Coexistence, 2nd Ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 334-338
[26] Combs, Jerald A. (1983), American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretation, Berkeley: University Press, pp. 232-233.
[27] Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1967), Origins of the Cold War, Foreign Affairs, Oct., 1967, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Oct. 1967), pp. 22-52, Council on Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations (pub.), p. 10
[28] Yalman, Richard and Bartlit, Nancy (2016), Japanese Mass Suicides, Nuclear Museum, Atomic Heritage Foundation (pub.) [online]. Last accessed Mar. 5 2023: https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/japanese-mass-suicides
[29] Saul, David (2020), The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Pilots of World War II, The National WWII Museum, New Orleans [online]. Last accessed Mar. 5, 2023: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-kamikaze-pilots-wwii
[30] Fitzpatrick, Sheila (2015), Impact of the Opening of Soviet Archives on Western Scholarship on Soviet Social History, Wiley Online Library (pub.), Jun. 9, 2015, [online]. Last accessed Feb. 7, 2023: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/russ.12021#:~:text=The%opening%of%formerly%closed,historians%working%in%this%field
[31] White, Timothy J. (2000), Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies, International Social Science Review, 2000, Vol. 75, No.s 3 & 4 (2000), Pi Gamma Mu, International Honor Society in Social Sciences (pub.)
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